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ON THE NASH SOLUTION 
By Satoshi SECHIY AMA * 
I Introduction 
The aim of this brief paper is to discuss the subject of Nash's solution of the 
duopoly problem. It will be convenient to give a general outline of the problem 
before going into any further discussion. 
Whenever any description is to be given of a case where one person is participat-
ing in a competition or a case where two persons or more are participating, it is very 
important to discern the difference between the former and the latter situation 
taking into consideration that the decisions made and the resulting behaviour of the 
participants in the latter case, unlike the former, are inter-dependent. In addition 
to this seemingly obvious point, it must also be noted that there is a possibility that 
any competition in which two or more competitors are participating may give rise 
to the following two situations-one where the interests of each participant stand 
completely opposed to each other and another where some of the participants, with 
their opposing interests on one hand, may be enabled on the other hand to obtain 
greater advantage by forming a kind of coalition among themselves than other 
participants who are not so joined. Obviously these situations cannot occur in 
the case of one participant, namely a case of monopoly. Of the two peculiarities 
of a two-person competition, as compared with a case of monopoly, what makes 
the problem fundamentally complicated is the very possibility that the participants 
may obtain greater advantage through their concerted efforts. 
If the acts of each participant cannot be other than mutually restricted, then 
each participant must determine his own acts by anticipating all possible influences 
which his act may exert upon all of his rivals. In other words, the optimal strategy 
for one's own benefit is to be determined in anticipation of all determinate or 
probable responses that his rivals may take in response to the particular act of his 
own. Such relationships between moves and responses observable in a competition is 
not of much importance when the scale of each participant is small in relation to the 
size of the market. This is, needless to say, one condition of a pure competition, 
which constitutes one important prerequisite supporting the hypothesis "ceteris 
paribus". Consequently it is in the case of a small number of participants that the 
relationships between moves and responses have an important bearing upon the 
results of a competition. In particular, an example of two-person participation 
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may well be taken as a standard model case, on which basis an analysis of competitive 
interactions should be undertaken. According to the duopolists in Coumot [4J, 
the optimal output to maximize one's own profit is determined on the assumption 
that the output of the rival will not be affected by his own decision making under 
a certain given market demand function. The point where two output reaction 
curves (each indicating the optimal outputs in response to the outputs of one's rival) 
intersect is the equilibrium point for the market. What characterises Coumot's 
equilibrium solution is one specific assumption being formed by each participant 
about the behavior of his opposing competitor. As is easily imaginable, if there is any 
change in this behavior, Coumot's solution can no longer be the equilibrium solution. 
Thus we are led to conclude that many subsequent discussions of Coumot's treatment 
were based without exception on different assumptions from that of Cournot relating 
to the competitors' strategies. For examples may be considered a case of market 
behaviour on the assumption of mutual understanding that the opponent's price is 
given, a case of a market structure where price fluctuations become possible, or 
to make inter-dependence more complicated, a case where an output (or price) is 
determined by anticipating that each opposing competitor will determine his own 
optimal output (or price) in anticipation of the optimal output (or price) determined 
by an opposing competior" . As to these various kinds of assumption, we must still 
question further to see whether each of the assumptions can be supported in terms 
of actual market relationships having a close resemblance to a duopoly. Now, 
disregarding this aspect, when the consistency of each of the said assumptions is put 
to question, we find that each of them includes a common contradiction. 
Cournot's assumption appears to be inconsistent with the requirement of max-
imizing profit, because such requirement should make it necessary to take all pos-
sible influences to be exercised by a decision as well as its direct effect to which the 
cournot case was exclusively directed on the assumption that the decision making 
with regard to one's own output will not have any influence upon decisions regarding 
his reva]'s output. With the sole exception of Chamberlin's model in which 
emphasis is placed on such comprehensive inter- dependency, all other models are 
not quite free from this kind of contradiction. Therefore, in order to correct this 
it becomes necessary to consider accurately the effects of inter-dependency upon the 
choice of actions. Nevertheless, that each of them will determine the optimal 
strategy of his own upon assuming the same patterns of responses from the opposing 
competiotr would imply that the said pattems of response are not taking place in 
reality and hence the decision making in that case is based on an erroneous antic-
ipation. In this way Chamberlin's assumption and equilibrium solution are not 
entirely satisfactory, if viewed from the requirement of maximizing profit. Putting 
I) cr. Aoyama [I], Chapter 3; Baumol [2], Chapter 3; Chamberlin [4], Chapter 3 and 
Appendix A. 
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it in another way, the assumptions so far used in any duopoly case, including the 
one discussed by Cournot, have been based on an idea that the interests of each. 
competitor are perfectly incompatible with each other and efforts have been made to 
try to find the optimal strategy by providing various patterns of responses common 
to every rival. However, in order to fulfill the requirement of maximizing profit 
correctly, it is an absolute necessity to deal not merely with cases wherein the inter-
ests of each competitor stand in confrontation but also with other cases wherein it 
becomes possible for each competitor to gain more profit if one of the competitors 
acts cooperatively with the other for this purpose. 
In Nash [8] we can see his attempt to give a general solution of the duopoly 
problem, regarding it as a two-person cooperative game in which the interests of 
each person are not completely incompatible. Because the number of available 
strategies would increase if the possibility of coalition on the part of some other 
competitors is realised, the attainable gains for such competitors could not 
be smaller than in a case of complete confrontation. As will be explained later, it 
becomes possible to attain a point, Pareto-superior to the profit point attained 
by the optimum strategy in terms of Cournot's equilibrium. Any point on the 
boundary of the attainable profit sphere located to the northeastward from 
Cournot's point becomes Pareto-optimal. Hence it is impossible to apply the 
Pareto-ranking to the comparison of any point on the boundary. Nash worked out 
a specific point on the boundary as the solution by making use of the concept of 
threat. 
II Nash's Solution 
I . Premises: 
(I) Each player I, 2 has a compact and convex strategy set S " S, respectively, 
each of which is composed of mixed strategies SI, s,. 
(2) The pay-off set (U1, u,) due to the acts carried out either independently or 
in cooperation by the player I and 2 is represented by B (U1, u, represents the 
pay-off of the player I or 2 respectively). And B is convex and compact. 
(3) If the pay-off for the player I or 2, when the strategy (SI, s,) EO s, X S, is 
being used, are expressed by P, (SI' s,), P, (SI, S,), Pi (i=l, 2) compose a bi-linear 
form of Sl, sz2l. 
(4) The players have perfect information available with respect to the game 
structure and the pay-off relationships of his own and of his rival, and he is supposed 
to act rationally. 
(5) Whenever the player finds that his demand contradicts the rival's demand, 
2) This is determined by the nature or the utility function specified for the player. von Neumann= 
Morgenstern [16], Chapter 1, Part 3; Nash [12]. 
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the player manages himself to develop the game in favour of himself. 
2. Negotiation Model 
Here a negotiation model composed of four stages as shown below is considered. 
(I) Selection of threat ti (i=l, 2): 
Each player uses the mixed strategies ti whenever the demand di(i= 1,2) stands 
in contradiction. 
(2) Each player mutually lets his threats be known. 
(3) The demand di is held independently. 
(4) Determination of pay-off: 
Whenever the demand is compatible, the pay-off is settled at the amount 
demanded and whenever incompatible, the pay-off is what the threat gives. This 




if (d" d,)rf.B. 
Since among all four stages, (2) and (4) do not include the decision making by the 
players, what is called the negotiation game is a game composed of two moves as 
indicated in (I) and (3). Furthermore, since the decision making for the demand 
is made in stage (3), which is the second move, upon knowing the decision made as 
a result of the first move, i. e. the threat in stage (1), a game which includes 
only the second move, having the pay-off functions which are determined by 
the threat selected in the manner described in stage (1), can be composed. This 
is called the demand game. 
3. The Demand Game 
Supposing that the players I and 2 are respectively making selection of the 
threat t
" 
t, in stage (I), and that the pay-off for the palyers I and 2 under the afore-
mentioned conditions are respectively expressed as P,(t" t,) =U,N, P,(t" t,) =U,N. Then 
under the following conditions 








the pay-off functions for each player can be expressed as follows: 




Generally speaking, there is a possibility that countless numbers of equilibrium 
solutions can be found in the demand game to be player under such pay-off functions. 
ON THE NASH SOLUTION 33 
Now, in order to obtain the game solution, g (d" d,) is converted into the follow-
ing continuous function h (d" d,), i. e., 
h { = I 
-->0 
if (d" d,)EB. 
as (d" d,) go farther and farther away 
toward the outside direction from B. 
Again, if U'N=O, U,N=O by making proper transformation of the utility 
functions, the pay-off functions of the smoothed game can be expressed as follows, 
taking the place of (3·2): 
(3·3) p, = d,h, p, = d,h. 
Since it is reasonable for each player to determine respective demand so that 
the pay-off can be maximized, the equilibrium point under (3·3) is (d" d,) which 
satisfies 
(3-4) 
[ a(d,h)]=O ad, ' 
[ a~d,h) ] = o. 
In the meanwhile, (d" d,) which satisfies the following conditions also satisfies (3-4) : 
a 
ad, [d,d,h] = 0, 
a 
ad, [d,d,h] = o. 
Now, supposing that the point to maximize d, d, h is P and the maximum value 
of u, u, is p (because d" d, are replaceable with U" u,), the following relationships 
are obtainable: 
Since the maximum value of [u, u,] ,,,,,,,EB is p, 
Supposing that the point which maximises [UI u,] is on the sphere B, the afore-
mentioned relationships can be shown in Figure I. When (d" d,) are incompatible, 
the position of P is situated in an upward direction from u, u,=p. Further, at this 
time P must be sufficiently close to B, if the value of h should be as close to I as pos-








Fig. I Solution of Demand Game 
---UI 
closer to B, as less and less smoothing is applied to g (dl , d,), that is, the faster and 
faster h tends to decline as P goes farther and farther away from B. Since Q. is the 
only point of contact of B with the field located in the upward position of Ul u,=p, P 
makes a closer approach toward Q.. 
Because Q.is the only limiting point of the smoothed game equilibrium, (u" u,) 
on Q. is the optimal demand and at the same time Q. is the solution of the original 
demand game. 
The following relationships are established between the optimal solution of 
the demand game, Q., and the pay-off guaranteed by a given threat, N. 
Since Q. is the point which makes Ul u, maximized on the cordinate with the 
basic point N, if the boundary of B is put as f (Ul, u,) =0, the following relationships 
are established at Q.: 
(3'5) U2-U2N dU2 Ul-UIN = - dUI • 
The geometrical relationships of (3·5) show that Q.is the optimal solution under 
N when NQ. makes a positive slope and the support line T of B passing through Q, 
with the negative-valved slope of NQ. (See Figure J). 
Whenever Q. is on the horizontal line (or vertical line) which passes through 
N, Q. becomes the solution under N. Now, at this time if the slope of the support 
line at Q. is properly interpreted, it may be assumed that the relationships of (3·5) 
are also being established at this point. Therefore, (3·5) provides necessary and 
sufficient conditions for Q. to be the optimal solution. 
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In the meanwhile, since the sllope ddu, of the tangent at the boundary of B 
u, 
varies continuously, a straight line with a slope - ddu, (hereafter this line IS re-
u, 
ferred as a complementary line) which goes through its contact point varies 
continuously, too". Consequently, now, if Q. is assumed to be the function of N, 
Q.(N), then there exists an adequate a for any given small positive number <, and 
it becomes possible to choose N, in such manner as to establish the following 
relationships. In other words, Q. is continuous with respect to N. 
(3-6) when IIN-N'II<a, IIQ.(N)-Q.(N')II«. 
4. The Threat Game 
Presupposing that the demand game solution is the pay-off function, I shall 
now discuss a particular game which is only concerned with the moves of the first 
stage of the negotiation model. In short, the determination of the optimal threat 
is going to be made upon presupposing a certain Q., but because this presupposed Q. 
B 
Fig. II Image of Optimal Threat 
3) The portion of the boundary which becomes possible solutions to the demand game is the down-
ward sloping part on the northeast boundary to N. Since B is convex, th eSllpplementary line 
for a point belonging to this portion begins to increase its slope more and more from left to right. 
Consequently, if they are to intersect, such intersection takes place only on the boundary. 
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depends upon the selection of threat as seen in 3, both the demand game and the 
threat game are mutually correlated with each other, and in this way they compose 
a negotiation model. 
Now, supposing that the threat of the player 1 is fixed at t-, we will see from the 
premise 1 (3) thatp, (i" t,),p, (i" t,) are continuous linearfunctions oft,. Therefore, 
it means the existence of the following linear transformation: 
If among all images ¢ (S,) that portion which falls on the most favourable comple-
mentary line K for the player 2 is expressed by ¢*, then ¢* is the image of the 
optimal threat of the player 2 in relation to i,". 
There is no guarantee that the optimal strategy for player I in relation to S,* 
should be I, when the optimal threat of player 2 in relation to I, is S,*. If there 
exists an equilibrium solution in the threat game at all, then each threat adopted 
respectively by the two players at that time should be simultaneously an optimal 
threat in relation to each other. Now, the fact that a pair of such optimal threats 
does exist can be drawn from the following relationships" : 
4) Cf. 3). 
5) Proof for each case runs as follows: 
(4·1 ) 
(4,2) ..... . 
(4·3) ..... . 
(H) ..... . 
Trivial since Sz is compact and convex and cp is a continuous linear transformation. 
(i) ¢* is an intersection of¢(S,) with K. From (4·1), ¢(S,) is a closed set. If K 
is regarded as a segmental line divided by the boundary of B, then K is a closed set. 
Therefore, ¢*(=cp(S,)nK) is a closed subset ofcp(S,). Because cp is a continuous 
linear transformation, the inverse-image ¢-1(¢~) =S2* is a closed subset of S2. As 
S2 is compact, so S2* is compact. 
(ii) Since cjJ* is located on a segment K, evidently it is convex. Consequently, if 
any two points (cp,*,cp,*) on cp* are picked up (where cp,*=cp(S,'), cp,*=cp(S,'), 
and S,', S,'ES,*), for a such that O<a<l, acp,*+(1-a)cp,* = acp(S,')+(I-a) 
cp(S,') =cp[aS,'+(I-a)S,'] Ecp*. Therefore as'+,(1-a)S,'ES,*. From (i) and 
(ii), S2* is compact and convex. 
N[Pl(tlJ t2)' pz(tt, t2)] is continuous with respect to tl, and t2) and Q is continuous 
with respect to tl and t2 (Cr. 3). When player 1 takes a threat tlv(lJ= 1,2, ... ), 
the optimal threat set for player 2 corresponding to t1~ is expressed as S2"'(t1~)' 
Now, since the payoffs of the game to be determined by lt~ and the optimal threat 
t 2v ES2* for player 2 are Q(tlv , t2~)' from the continuity of Q, when limtl~=tl' 
limtzv=t2' it leads to lim Q(t 1",t2")=Q(tt,t2)' 
Now, supposing that 12 is not the optimal threat for player 2 in relation to tl, 
when the optimal threat 121 belonging to S2*(t1) is taken, Q(tt, t21) gives a greater 
payoff for player 2 than Q(t" t,). Consequently, if a pair (t,N, t,N) which 
sufficiently closed to (t1, t2) is taken, it may be assumed from the continuity of Q 
that there exists such threat IzN' that gives more desirable Q(t 1N, t2 N') for the 
player 2 than Q(t1 N,ezN). However, because t2NES2'" (tIN), this is a contradiction. 
Therefore t2ES2'" (tl) and S2"'(t1) is upper semi-continuous with respect to t 1. 
From (4,3), SI*(/2), and S2*(t1) are respectively upper semi-continuous with respect 
to t2 and t1. Hence S1*(/2) XS2*(tl) are upper semi-continuous with respect to 
(t1,/2)' Also, because S1*(t2) and S2*(/l) are respective1y a convex subset or 
S1, S2, S1*(t2) XS2"'(t1) are a convex subset of SI xSz. 
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(4.1) ¢ (S,) is compact and convex, 
(4.2) S,* is a compact and convex subset of S" 
(4·3) If the optimal threat for the player 2 in relation to a threat I, for the 
player I is expressed as S,*(I,), then S,*(I,) is upper semi-continuous with respect to 
1,. If I, is fixed and the linear transformation ¢ (II) = N [pI (1,,t2), P, (1,,t2)] is applied, 
the propositions just given above are established respectively in relation with rp (S,), 
¢*, S,* (I,). 
ers: 
For any threat pair (II, (2) there exist the following optimal threasts for two play-
S,*(12) in relation to I, for player I, 
S 2* (I I) in relation to I I for player 2. 
Now, if R (II, I,) is supposed to be a pair of optimal threasts obtained from S,* (12), 
S2* (II) then from (4-1)-(4·3) the following propositions are generated: 
(4·4) R (tl' t,) is upper semi-continuous with respect to (t" t2) and a convex 
subset of S, X S2. 
From (4,4) we see that the conditions of Kakutani's theorem are satisfied, and 
there exist (tl' i2) such that (£, t;) E R (t:, t;). In other words the relationship 
in which each threat of two players becomes the optimal threat to each other is 
brought into existence. This is the equilibrium solution of the threat game. 
III EconoIDic Significance of the Solution 
The optimal solution of the demand game Q. (t,', 1,'), is determined under 
a given threat (ti', t,I), but because each of two players tries to achieve a greater 
demand of his own the player I uses t,' such that t,' E S,* (12') and the player 2 
uses I,' such that t22 E S2* (I,') resulting ultimately in Q. (II', t,2). If such reaction 
is mutually repeated, it leads to (i" t2) such that (£, I~) E S,* (t2) xS,* (i,). 
Hence, however many times such reaction may be repeated later on, the players al-
ways get to the same Q. (t:, I:). In other words Q. (i" I~) is the equilibrium demand 
solution of this negotiation model. 
This model is of an extremely abstract nature as is evident from the foregoing 
section II. For this reason it is applicable to a variety of cases such as negotiations 
between employer and employees, commercial problems between two countries 
and a case of bilateral monopoly, etc. I shall here seek to clarify the meanings of 
the solution by comparing the two players to the two mineral spring owners in 
Cournot's case". 
6) In Mayberry [11]. each solution according to Cournot and von Neumann is compared with 
that of Nash by making use of numerical examples of duopolists having gradually increasing 
different cost functions. In Bishop [3], a duopoly model composed of a constant average high 
cost producer and a constant low cost producer is explained with illustrations and a com-
prehensive discussion of each solution of Raiffa, Shapley, Nash, Zeuthen. etc. is given. 
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p ... price 
p = 1O-2(q,+q,) q, ... supply of duopolist I, 
q, ... supply of duopolist 2 
"'" "" for duopolist I and 2 are expressed as 
"" = IOq,-2q,'-2q,q" 
"" = IOq,-2q,'-2q,q,. 
If the duopolist is supposed to act as Cournot thinks, then 
(3'2) a"" _ 0 aq, - , a"" _ 0 aq, - . 
From (3'1), (3'2), Cournot's equilibrium output and profit can be expressed as 
3 q, = q, = -:5 ' 
50 
7rl = 7r.2 = 9 
On the other hand, if the duopolists I and 2 are supposed to determine 
the outputs cooperatively, an attainable sphere for ("", ",,) widens and the following 
relation is established at the boundary of the sphere: 
I ~ aq, 
I ~ aq, = O. 
5 Therefore, when q'='I"-q" ("" ",,) are located on the boundary, satisfying 
(3·3) 
Now, when the output of the duopolist 1 is q" a pair of ("", ",,) which satisfies the 
following formula is obtainable: 
(H) 
If the output of duopolist 2 is fiexd at q" then 
(3·5) 
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'" = --2' ,,,,j,,,-2q,(5-q,)l. q, 
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In order to achieve the greatest profit duopolist I makes selection of the threat so 
that (",, ",), under the restriction of (3·5), will come on the most favourable com-
plementary line in his favour. In a similar manner, duopolist 2 also determines his 
threat so that ("" ",) of (3,4) will come on the most favourable complementary line. 
In this way duopolist I adopts a certain optimal threat in relation to q, and duo-
polist 2 determines his optimal threat in relation to gl, Now, if q, and q, are the 
optimal threats for the two players respectively, then the necessary and sufficient 
conditions are: 
(i) The same "" '" are established in (3'4) and (3·5), 
(ii) The slope dd", of the tangent of (3'4) and (3'5) at the point of (;;" ;;,) 
'" are identical, their values being I. 
From the conditions of the former half of (i) and (ii), 
(3-6) (i" ;;,) = (0, 0). 
Again, from (304) and (3'5), using 
and 
(3,7) q, = 5-q,. 
Since d", = -1 at the boundary (3·3) of the sphere of attainable profit, 
d '" 
, , 5 5-q, q, hI' d ql=q'=-2 can be drawn from - 5 ' 1. When eac payer IS a opt-ql -q, 
ing the threat which satisfies the conditions of (3·7) and particularly when the 
optimal threat is being used, the attainable profit is given III (3'6) (Cf. N (i" /,) 
in II 4). 
If gl, q, is supposed to represent the optimal output threat ~, then (304) and 
(3'5) correspond respectively to S,* (tl), S,* (t,) of II 4. These relationships are 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
I t is evident that the equilibrium output of the duopoly case according to 
Nash's method is more restricted than it is in the case of Cournot's solution. The 
duopolists gain greater profits by imposing cooperative restriction on the quantity 
of supply or by raising the price than the case of Cournot's equilibrium. 
Next let us examine the stability of Nash's solution. Now, supposing some 
threats q" q, which satisfy p= 10-2 (ql +q,) ~O, duopolist I determines a new threat 
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so that (1tI' 1t,) of (3·5) will make contact with the most favourable complementary 
line. Since the slope of the complementary line is I in the given example, it 
leads to 
d1tI _ I 
d1t, - . 1t, = q,(5-2p,). 
Seeing that 1t, can be attained under the unknown threat qI, and a given threat q" 
the following expression is drawn from (3·1): 
q.(5-2q,) = IOq.-2q,'-2q.q" 
Determining tbe optimal threat q, for duopolist 2 in the same manner, we get 
q,= ~. Since we can confirm that the optimal threat to a threat of ( ~, ~) are 
also (~, ~), (~, ~) are the optimal threats of the duopoly model. 
Putting it in other way, because an unquestionable sequence, originating from 
any given threat (qI, q2), comes into existence as demonstrated below, Nash's solution 
is stable". 
7) The equilibrium solution of the threat game is stable. Supposing that the optimal threat 
is (tl' (2) and the payoff of the threat game [Q.l (tl' fz), Q.z (tt, t2)], because the boundary of B 
slopes down ward, 
Q 1 ('" t2) "Q I ('" t,) "Q I (t" I,), 
Q2(t" '2)" Q.(t" /,)" Q,('" t,), 
and (tl' f2) is a saddle~point solution. 
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,-Threa t Game-, 
(q" q,) => N(q" q,) - Q.(g" g,) => (~, ~) 
'-- Demand Game --' 
IV Interpretation of the Threat 
1. Axiomatic Approach 
It is known that Nash attempted to solve the problem in question on the pre-
sumption of a few axioms which were laid down on the basis of several specific 
features with which the solution should be characterised. 
Supposing that S" S, represent a set of mixed strategies for respective player 
I and 2 and that B represents a set of pay-offs, the solution V" v, of the game for 
players I and 2 should satisfy the following axioms: 
Axiom l-Pareto-Optimality: 
There exists a unique solution, (v" v,) and this solution shall not be governed 
by any other one in B. If 
then (u" u,) is the solution. 
Axiom 2-Invariance with respect to utility scales: 
Even if the linear transformation which maintains order is applied to pay-off, 
both the solution before the linear transformation and the solution after the trans-
formation can be correlated by the same transformation. In other words, the 
solution is substantially constant, though transformed". 
Axiom 3-Symmetry of the Solution: 
If B is symmetrical, each solution of two players is identical. In other words, 
if (v" v,) belongs to B, and (v" v,) also belong to B, the solution is v, =v" not affected 
by the names of players. 
Axiom 4--Independence of irrelevant Alternatives: 
In a new game such that the strategy-sets are S" S, and the pay-off-set is B', 
(B' eB), if the solution (v" V2) of B is included in B', then (v" V2) is the solution of 
B'. 
Since it can be proved that the only solution which would satisfY these axioms 
B) Under linear utility functions like von Neumann==Morgenstern's, it is possible to treat both the 
payoff frontier and the utility frontier as if they were of the same nature. 
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is no less than the solution of the non-cooperative game in the case of negotiation", 
of which explanation was given above, Nash's method has a wide range of applica-
tion as was asserted by Nash himself. Yet a little further investigation will, show us 
some shortcomings in those axioms which appear to be seemingly reasonable"). 
We shall take them up with an emphasis on the problem of the interpersonal com-
parison of utility which has much to do with our further argument. 
It can well be assumed that Nash himself, needless to say, holds the basic stand-
point that such interpersonal comparison of utility is impossible. It is unquestion-
able that the structure of his theory is not explicitly based on the presumption of the 
the interpersonal comparison of utility. However, when the solution obtained 
therefrom is closely examined in its relation to his axiom of symmetry it becomes 
quite clear that some interpersonal comparison of utility is presupposed. 
The attainable sphere of the solution in the numerical example of III is ob-
viously of a symmetrical nature and Nash' solution is determined at the point 
( ~5, ~) which gives increased pay-off in an equal amount to each of those 
duopolists, compared with the pay-off basic point (0, 0) which is to be 
determined by the optimal threat ( ~, ~). Because the solution satisfies axiom 
3, it must be considered that it carries a certain kind of desirability or fairness 
entrused to the content of the axiom. If one of the duopolists is supposed to have 
a marginal utility to decline rapidly, while the other a marginal utility to decline 
slowly, it will lead to a conclusion that the increased portion of the share of 
pay-off in an equivalent amount does not satisfy social justicew • Such difference 
in the appraisal of that increased portion of pay-off for the duopolists is not a 
special case of rare occurrence, but might just as well be considered as a very 
ordinary matter which is caused by the difference in the extent of the pressing 
need for funds in view of the status of accumulation achieved up to that time and 
the business policy to be pursued in the future. And it is also natural that each 
one of the parties concerned has his own way of appraisal of the pay-off which is 
different from that of others in a case of ordinary negotiation. If the interpersonal 
comparison of utility is to be completely excluded under such circumstance, then 
9) The axioms listed here are taken from Nash [12]. In [13] two more axioms are added and it is 
proved there that the solution which satisfies the axioms is identical with that of the negotiation 
model. About the proof of identity under axioms 1-4 see Luce = Raiffa [10], pp. 127-128. 
10) More detailed discussion of this point is developed in Luce:;:Raiffa [10], pp.128-137 and Bishop 
[3], pp. 578-582. To further better understanding on this point it is necessary to make re-
ferences to many experiments such as working out the design of other kinds of games which satisfy 
Nash' axioms and examining the relationships between the results obtained therefrom and 
these axioms. The book compiled by Suzuki [15] contains some of the results of such experiments 
conducted by the author and others in Chapter 9. In addition, in Chapters, 7 and 8 a survey of 
the theory of a negotiation game is also given, which is worthy of notice. 
11) Bishop [3], pp. 576-577. 
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Nash solution would diverge from social justice, which would only serve to satisfy 
a certain kind of desirability. It is only when both parties concerned happen to 
have the same marginal utility with respect to the pay-off that his solution 
conforms to social justice. On the other hand, if the interpersonal comparison of 
utility is to be explicity presupposed, then what must be made clear is the 
relationships between the solution to maximize the product of increased shares 
of pay-off to be received by both parties concerned, and social welfare"'. Be 
that as it may, it is seen that this dilemma pointed out in the symmetrical nature 
of Nash's solution does exert no small influence on the positive or normative 
nature with which the solution should be characterised, as will be made clear later 
in relation to threat. 
2. Appraisal of Threat 
There is no need of argument that the significance of Nash's solution, unlike 
all other conventional theories, lies in the fact that one point on the frontier of 
negotiation pay-off set, or one point on the contract curve has been designated as an 
equilibrium point. We pointed out above that the use of threat constituted a very 
important element in settling this one point. In short, the solution of the demand 
game is to come to a settlement, based on a fixed basic point to be given by a certain 
optimal threat, but each player arrives at a new solution by using his own threat 
to counteract his rival's threat so that he can obtain more favourable demand in the 
subsequent demand game than before. The equilibrium solution of negotiation is 
the point where the repetion of these moves is ultimately arrived at. Since the use 
of threat is one competitive means to determine the equilibrium solution by con-
tinuously playing demand games in succession one after another, if the shortcomings 
disclosed in the demand game which were pointed out in the foregoign section are 
to be disregarded, the rationality of the negotiation solution, primarily depends on 
whether use of threat is in conformity with actual facts or not. The same holds 
with the solution by the axiomatic approach. The significance and effectiveness 
of an arbitration proposal which satisfies Nash's axioms lies in eliminating the actual 
dispute or fight to be continued at the sacrifice of no small expense by guessing what 
the result will be when the non-cooperative competition between the two parties 
concerned is left to follow its own course without entrusting its settlement· to arbitra-
tion. But when the arbitration proposal is based on erroneous judgements with 
respect to elements such as the pay-off or utility function of the two parties concerned 
and the strategy-sets, particularly threat, such arbitration will be turned down 
12) It is clear enough according to Harsanyi [8] that the solution by way of maximizing the product 
of the pay-offs is identical with the solution of Zeuthen. In this way Nash's solution has been 
backed up by the behavior of the players who make every effort respectively to maximize 
the predictable amount of their pay-off, but the relation of the solution to the social welfare still 
remains to be explained. 
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by at least one of the two parties concerned. Therefore, a further discussion on the 
subject of the actualit.ies of threat is essential not only to further the better under-
standing of Nash's solution which is the immediate aim of this paper but also to 
improve the game-model in such way that the behaviour of each party concerned 
can be explained with more exactness. 
The strategy to produce desirable conditions in negotiation in favour of one's 
own interests by inflicting damage on one's opposing competitor is what is meant 
by threat. In this connection what should be noted are realities in which such 
strategy is inflicting certain damages upon one's enemy while on the other hand 
there is a possibility that a certain degree of damage is being suffered at the same 
time by the strategist himself, too. In order to emphasise the specific features of 
threat, it would be correct, in my opinion, to define threat rather as a strategy to 
inflict certain damages simultaneously on both sides. For an instance in the 
numerical example of the duopoly in III, supposing that the duopolists I and 2 
start the game under conditions of q,= I, q,=2, then the basic point becomes (4,8), 
which means that the immediate equilibrium solution is the distribution of profit 
( 17 33 ) at the rate of 4' 4 . Now, supposing one of the duopolists who objects to 
this distribution succeeds in making use of the profit (0,0), which is to be determined 
by a pair of the optimal threat ( ~, ~), as a final basic point of negotiation by 
exercising the threat ~. Because of the use of such threat as his strategy, he 
can inflict damage to the extent of 1: on his rival, but he himself is also obliged 
17 to suffer damage to the extent of 4. Any threat, as is self-explanatory from 
this example, must be not in the form of mere psychological threatening, but 
someting which must take the form of practical action or behaviour. 
If any threat is to be effective at all, it must satisfy the following conditions. 
Now, it is defined that, speaking of the pay-off set, the respective distances along the 
two axes on a coordinate from the basic point U (T) to be given by a certain pair of 
threats, T, to the maximum point ((;" (;,) of the pay-off products are the cost of 
conflict respectively to the player 1 and 2'" . This particular threat becomes effect 
tive, on condition that T is not optimal and the new threat used by player 1 in-
creases the cost to player 2 by b U, and the cost to player 1 by aU, and that b > a. 
Putting it in another way, the demand solution ((;,', (;,') under a new basic point 
U (T') as results of a pair of new threats T', is always (;,' > (;, and it is more 
favourable to player 1 than it is to player 2. 
The condition b>a can be divided into the following three cases: 
13) Harsanyi [8], pp. 152-153. 
(1) b>a;;'O, 
(2) b ;;, ° > a, 
(3) ° > b > a. 
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Case (3) is the situation where the new basic point V (T') belongs to the sphere 
surrounded by a line connecting V (T) and U, the axis V, and the frontier. In the 
case of (2), V (T') belongs to the sphere of V,;;' 0, V2 <,0. In both cases (2) and (3), 
the new threat strategy gives player 1 a greater pay-off of its own accord, i. e. without 
depending upon negotiation and for that reason it is a better strategy in the ordinary 
sense of the word. 
The peculiarity of a threat strategy lies in that it includes case (I). So-called 
cut-throat competition is, in my opinion, the situation most close to such case among 
all traditional concepts of competition. This price-war is mainly based on 
two different motives. One is where a competitior takes the course of cutting 
down prices in order to increase profits by depriving his rival of the market. 
Another is a situation where the price-cut competition is engaged in by disregarding 
the immediate profit in order to drive his rival completely from the market. 
Because the former is a development of price-cut competition in an ordinary sense, 
the type of competition closest to case (I) is the latter. 
-bi12 uTr') --------- --- ---
Fig. IV Efl"cacy of Threat 
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Nevertheless, in reality there are a few circumstances where such use of threats 
as those in case (I) appear to be unfavourable. In the first place we have the problem 
of the time required for negotiation. In the numerical example of duopoly of Bishop 
[3J, the optimal threat gives positive immediate profit to the low cost duopolist and 
negative immediate profit to the high cost duopolist. If it takes a long time for a 
settlement of negotiation, the utility function of the high cost duopolist's profit 
(or money) will not be a linear function as conceived by von Neumann and Morgen-
stern, but will be transformed into a shape indicating the decrease of the marginal 
utilityw. Therefore, it is most likely that the high cost duopolist may restrain himself 
from using a threat which might give negative immediate profit, even if it is of such 
a nature as to satisfy Nash's optimal requirements. 
Another circumstance to be considered is the difference in economic power. 
In this connection it is difficult to give a clear and accurate definition of the 
term 'economic power', but at this moment for convenience it may be defined as 
the power to resist damage. Let us take an example from a labour dispute, 
where there is every reasonable expectation that greater damage can be 
inflicted upon the business operator than that to be suffered by the union members 
when a labour union uses the threat of declaring a strike upon refusing a compromise. 
For the reason that the effective conditions for such threat are all satisfied, calling a 
strike is supposed to lead the next negotiation to be conducted in favour of the union. 
But, if the strike fund of the union is not sufficient to cover the loss of wages and other 
expenditure caused by the strike, the union cannot help but give up the strike. In 
this case, as in the foregoing case, the marginal utility for money on the part of the 
union is decreased. 
Now, let us take up the same situation from the angle of the low cost duopolist. 
The low cost manufacturer is not obliged to be in an disadvantageous position even 
when a new threat which presses him to bear additional cost of bU, is used. The 
same holds true with the case of the business administrator. Therefore, if the threat 
is to be used really effectively, the extent of real suffering to be inflicted upon player 
2 through the damage bU, must be greater than the real suffering to be inflicted 
upon player I through the damage aU,. However, this involves the problem of 
interpersonal comparison of utility as was made clear when the axiom of symmetry 
was discussed above. In the case of (2) and (3) it is possible to avoid this problem, 
but it is evident that in the case where a real threat is to be used, it is impossible to 
do so. 
14) Needless to say, under linear utility functions marginal utility is constant whether profit is 
positive or negative. Therefore, there is no possibility for such appraisal of threat. 
15) It is pointed out that the Shapley's solution does not reflect the influences of threat arising from 
the difference in productivity because its basic point is based on the minimum security level. But 
if the foregoing appraisal of the threat is to be accepted, the appropriateness of that criticism 
should he duly diministed. 
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In the meanwhile, if the above comments on the actuality of threat are correct, 
there is a possibility that the solution of the negotiation problem should become 
somewhat different from Nash's solution. Even if the method of Nash's solution of 
the demand game is used, it is possible to take the minimum security level of the 
players as their basic points in a manner as demonstrated in Shapley's solution and 
it is possible, also, that a case is likely to occur where a competition may be carried 
on in a manner as demonstrated by Cournot, whereby Counrot's point is regarded 
as their basic point. Bishop suggests the latter case as a solution when the negotiation 
turned out to be unsuccessful. Or, it may so happen, though it is a matter 
beyond the frame of all models taken up here, that the duopolists may restrain 
themselves from using any threat and endeavor to make their position more favourable 
by investing what they have in the form of profit on hand for market development. 
3. Conclusion 
So far there have been several discussions of the subject of threat which con-
stitutes the core of the Nash solution. These discussions, I believe, must be 
elucidated along the following two directions: 
One is the attempt to make a dynamic interpretation of threat along the lines 
of the context maintained by Bishop [4], Cross [7], etc. who are attempting a 
dynamic extension of Nash's solution by introducing an element of time in the 
process of negotiation. 
The other is by speculation about the threat in a n-person cooperative game. 
"To what extent and effect should the relative decline of the weight of one player 
caused by the increased number of players and the diversified kind of coalition 
prescribe the efficacy of threat?" is a question of paramount concern in this line of 
thought. 
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